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Book Reviews 
Elegy & Paradox: Testing the Conventions by W. David Shaw. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 279. $39.95. 
W. David Shaw's new book is an ambitious meditation on the genre of ele-
gy, the problems of critical method, and the history of Western culture. 
"Since death is not an experience inside life, but an event that takes place on 
its boundary" (5), Shaw posits an inherent connection between elegiac repre-
sentation and "paradox" (for him a contradiction which is resolvable), He 
can then present a history of the genre by sketching a history of its para-
doxes. So he does, charting a progression that moves through several dis-
crete stages. The stages arise as the elegist progressively adapts the 
conventions of the genre to his or her sense of mortal crisis. 
Shaw reconstructs this "testing," also a metaphor for the experience of 
reading, through close examinations of elegies ranging from Pearl to Lycidas 
to Romantic and Victorian texts by Wordsworth, Shelley, Tennyson, Arnold, 
and Hardy (among others). He then continues on to modern and contempo-
rary elegies by poets from Frost and Stevens to Amy Clampitt and Geoffrey 
Hill. Shaw practices what he terms an aesthetic or rhetorical criticism closely 
focused on the text itself. This text-centered approach he distinguishes from 
both the ideological specularity of post-structuralism and the excessively lo-
calized contextualization of new historicism. His own criticism seeks to 
marry formalism and history by recognizing that "the most authoritative his-
tories [of the elegy] have already been written" and remain "encoded in the 
elegies' own testing of conventions" (p. 236). 
Shaw identifies seven paradoxes which have shaped the elegy, but his his-
torical argument seems to depend principally upon four. This argument be-
gins with classical elegy. The poetics of the pastoral form which certain 
English elegies revive is a performative poetics which presumes the actualiz-
ing power of words. The paradox a performative rhetoric courts lies in the 
fact that if the elegist's power is to be real, it must be grounded (in a tran-
scendent Logos, for instance); yet if it is so grounded, then the power in evi-
dence is not truly the elegist's. Shaw's second paradox lies with the 
tautological structure of the circuitous confessional elegy. This form presents 
a process of discovery which cannot begin as a narrative until the process it-
self has paradoxically reached its end. His third main paradox is the paradox 
of the unspeakable. Here the mourner's deep sorrow and recognition of 
death's unknowability result in elegies which seek to incorporate silence as 
an index of value. Shaw's fourth main paradox, characteristic of the modern 
elegy, is the paradox of veridiction. Modern elegies dilate on the silences 
common in Romantic elegy until they become sites of fragmentation indicat-
ing the brokenness and fictiveness of truth. Because "even in denying a truth 
claim we presume to make one," however, the breakdowns of modern elegy 
can paradoXically become moments of breakthrough marking the elegis!' s 
enlightenment (147). Shaw links these four paradoxes as the main phases of 
the elegy's historical genealogy: they are the four movements mentioned, for 
instance, in his remarks on his book's intellectual genesis (235). 
My reservations about this impressive book concern its neglect of available 
criticism and its taxonomic organization. While Elegy and Paradox displays 
wide learning, its recourse to the secondary literature remains selective and 
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even rather casual at times. Shaw's bibliography includes comparatively few 
articles. For some poets, it lists comparatively few books, and in a few cases 
none published recently. In the case of Shelley, it lists no book at all. If Elegy 
and Paradox is not always thoroughgoing in its scholarship, it is exceptionally 
thoroughgoing in its commitment to classification. Discount the taxonomy of 
paradoxes and the book still abounds in classificatory gestures: e.g., the 
"comparison of 'Adonais' and 'Thyrsis' discloses five more specific differ-
ences between Romantic and Victorian elegy'; lithe paradox of ends raises 
three difficulties"; nWordsworth's elegies dramatize three kinds of silence"; 
chapter seven explores "six more specific ways in which Tennyson's elegies 
transgress earlier conventions"; and so on (34, 51, 112, 211). This classifica-
tory orientation promotes a tendency to read texts as illustrations of the 
(one) category assigned them. When such readings are also uninformed by 
the relevant scholarship, they can easily seem unpersuasive. 
Shaw's treatment of Adonais provides a case in point. Referring to the ac-
tualizing power of language in classical elegy and Lycidas, he comments: 
In Shelley, as in Milton, such an energy or force is best expressed as a 
metaphoric identity of subject and object.. . Unfortunately, Arnold, 
like many Victorians, is skeptical: he does not believe in the seer's me-
taphoric identities. He cannot substitute a tree or even a landscape for 
the presence of his friend, nor does he share Shelley's faith in the al-
most physical energy released by words and their power to tame a 
hostile or uncaring world. (11) 
No Romanticist will readily accept a contrast drawn between Shelley and 
Arnold on the basis of Arnold's skepticism. But in the light of Jerrold Ho-
gle's influential work on the decentering force of metaphor in Shelley, it is 
equally difficult to accept the reference to Shelley's visionary faith in meta-
phoric identities-especially given the climactic turn from metaphor to sim-
ile at the conclusion of Adonais: "The soul of Adonais, like a star" (line 494). 
To ease the reader's own skepticism, even established critics must anticipate 
and disarm objections. Any argument that Adonais dramatizes an incarna-
tional poetics of presence should engage available arguments that the poem 
is most powerfully informed by Shelley's association of language with the 
broken, vestigial, and belated. 
Actually, it is far from clear that Adonais couldn't be read as an example of 
several elegiac paradoxes. The poem depicts a version of the circuitous form 
of confessional elegy by unfolding as a vocative quest: in invoking Urania, 
Shelley seeks the inspiration necessary to mourn Adonais properly, but can-
not begin that seeking unless he already possesses the inspiration he seeks. 
Given the silent Adonais and Shelley'S intimation of the ineffable, Adonais, 
for all its sweep and energy, might appear to reveal the silence and absence 
in language. Just so, the economy of identification and rejection organizing 
the speaker's relation to Adonais might anticipate the divided mind and par-
adoxical brokenness of modern elegy. Most elegies, one feels, will cross cate-
gories and exhibit several interrelated paradoxes. This is all the more 
unsettling a possibility because the taxonomic organization of Shaw's book 
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underlies its historical argument. Taxonomy puts both rhetoric analysis and 
historical argument at risk in Elegy and Paradox. 
Shaw proves adept at controlling these risks. In charting the genealogy of 
the modern elegy, he accepts a family resemblance notion of poetic similarity 
and carefully shows that poems from different historical periods may reflect 
a similar stage in the elegy's generic development. The resulting qualifica-
tions leave his historical overview compelling in broad outline. Shaw's ac-
tual close readings are often masterful. From the opening discussion of 
rhyme in Lycidas, the author's responsiveness to stylistic nuance remains 
continually in evidence. Moreover, many of the risks taken in Elegy & Para-
dox appear clearly foreseen and unreservedly accepted. Shaw's commitment 
to risk-taking reflects his conviction that reading elegies is "a life-and-death 
issue" (7) both for individual readers and for the future of humanistic cul-
ture. Indeed, the book seems haunted at times by Foucault's prediction of 
the disappearance of man-which is cited several times-and by a concern 
that the history of the elegy may constitute an elegy for Western civilization. 
This concern explains the moral urgency which surfaces occaSionally in Elegy 
& Paradox. Shaw's close readings are efforts to restore the human face of the 
past for the present, to save history by rediscovering the emotional drama 
encoded in the creation and revision of poetic conventions. Elegy & Paradox 
is an important book which abounds in insights. Its most striking inSight, 
however, may be Shaw's recognition that the traditional task of the elegiac 
poet has become the task of the humanistic critic. 
University of Alabama William A. Ulmer 
Toward a Working-Class Canon: Literary Criticism in British Working-Class Peri-
odicals, 1816-1858 by Paul Thomas Murphy. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State 
University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 211. $39.50. 
The title of Paul Thomas Murphy's book, Toward a Working-Class Canon: 
Literary Criticism in British Working-Class Periodicals, 1816-1858, indicates a 
deliberate modesty about the project, and perhaps too, a dual frame of his-
torical reference. In unleashing his revisionist energies on the established lit-
erary canon, this late twentieth-century critic, like his nineteenth-century 
working-class predecessors, does not expect simply to produce for his read-
ers an alternative list of sanctioned literary texts. The procedures involved in 
canonization are more ambiguous and contested than any straightforward 
act of disclosure would allow, and Toward a Working-Class Canon benefits 
from its author's awareness of the aesthetic and political contingencies he 
has engaged. As a historical construction and as a literary-historical recon-
struction, the idea of a nineteenth-century working-class canon was, and 
must remain, something to be approached and argued, rather than achieved. 
In one of his more ambitious formulations, Murphy invokes E. P. Thomp-
son's The Making of the English Working Class, and presents his own work as a 
companion piece, in which members of the working class are treated as ac-
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tive agents in the ongoing project of "the making of their own literary val-
ues" (2). 
Murphy is not, of course, the first to approach this material, and he rec-
ords his debt to such earlier accounts as Louis James's Fiction for the Working 
Man (1963) and Martha Vicinus' The Industrial Muse (1974). But his distinc-
tive method, in accord with the recent meta critical interest in the history of 
literary history, focuses on the activity of the working-class critic and re-
viewer in the periodical press. "This work is not in itself a study of working-
class literature, but is instead a study of the perceptions of literature by 
working-class writers and editors" (4). Murphy's interests are historical, even 
at times sociological, rather than interpretive or evaluative. The result is an 
important map of the working-class experience of literature in nineteenth-
century Britain, and it is difficult to fault Murphy if his study finally raises 
more questions than it answers. 
The book begins with a preliminary survey of the conditions that made an 
alternative canon possible: an active working-class radical press, rising liter-
acy rates, and related habits of plebeian autodidacticisrn, including what 
Murphy usefully terms "second literacy," the "highly-motivated and wide-
ranging program of reading, often undertaken years after the reader had first 
learned to read" (17), in which readers organized their emerging literacy 
around a set of indispensable, formative texts. Later chapters on fiction, po-
etry, and drama are then organized around a three part division of the pe-
riod under analysis. An initial phase of radical protest (1816-1829), triggered 
by post-war economic dislocation and popular unrest, gave way first to the 
"war of the unstamped" (1830-1836), and then to a more extended phase of 
Chartist organization and protest (1837-1858). For each literary genre, the 
working-class canon in the first phase tended to be narrow and exclusively 
political, with an overriding concern for what Murphy insists upon calling 
"the politically correct," as opposed to the aesthetically pleasing; subsequent 
critics were able "to take a broader view of literature than their predecessors, 
and were concerned as much with the pleasure of the text as with its value" 
(57). The Chartist journalist above all is the hero of this narrative, responsible 
for producing a "complex, subtle, and human" (60) sense of literary value 
that transcended the more utilitarian dispensation of the earliest working-
class critics. 
This relatively schematic historical narrative does not prevent more nu-
anced distinctions. We find, for example, that Richard Carlile was, in his re-
sistance to aesthetic value, "the great literary iconoclast" (40) and most 
strident of the early ideologues, while T. J. Wooler, editor of the richly satiri-
cal Black Dwarf (1817-1824), displayed more flexibility, and "was the first 
working-class critic to notice and stress the idea of the pleasurable in poetry 
and the notion of its nonargumentative and emotional power" (107). And 
drama rums out to be an exceptional case throughout the period under dis-
cussion, with working-class critics consistently demeaning established theat-
rical performances, while at the same time participating in a political 
movement that displayed "a powerful and thriving dramatic aesthetic" (154) 
in public meetings, processions, and debates. Despite these subtleties, the 
book sometimes flattens out important historical differences, above all, in its 
fundamental conception of a "working-class canon." There is, on the one 
r 
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hand, a tendency to invest all popular or plebeian radical protest with a 
working-class characterr and on the other, a tendency to operate with a rela-
tively undeveloped sense of what the working-class experience might have 
involved. Murphy undertakes early on to tell us what he means by a 
"working-class periodical," but the definition takes the socio-economic phe-
nomenon of class, if not its discursive expression, as a given: "I define a 
working-class periodical as a periodical that is self-consciously directed to-
ward the working class and that clearly reflects working-class interests" (31). 
This leads to some troubling formulations for the period before 1830-
Paine's "class-based view of the political system" (34), Carlile's "distinctly 
working-class bias" (lOl)-and throughout the book, radical political protest 
and libertarian rhetoric are equated with the values of the working class. We 
learn little about the extra-political character of this class of critics, and are 
left wondering for the most part whether their distinctive experience of (for 
example) capitalism, community, gender, and domesticity had a substantial 
impact on their criticism. 
The book does not always operate with a consistent attitude to canonization 
and its discontents. From the outset, an alternative to "a universal or class-
transcendent canon (19) seems to be something worth finding, and Murphy 
concludes with some interesting remarks about the fluidity of any canon. If A 
refreshing aspect of working-class criticism (and something that modern crit-
ics would be wise to consider) is the clear recognition of the connection be-
tween what is read and what is happening, and, in consequence, an openness 
to testing all works for value and wariness of relying without question upon 
established notions of value" (169). Along the way, however, a critical concern 
with the present does not always seem so salutary, as poems are "stretched 
to fit the context of the present moment" (118), and even Shakespeare is 
(absurdly?) "made into a Chartist" (127). Distortion and misreading were, 
it seems, as often a consequence of the working-class perspective as 
"refreshing" insight. Murphy's account of the process by which working-class 
critics assiduously refashioned the canon is, furthermore, informed by a sur-
prisingly traditional sense of literary value. If it is true that the working-class 
press "preferred now-forgotten political poets to Tennyson or Browning" in 
order to communicate to their readers a sense of "highly charged relevance" 
(l08), it is also true that we as readers come away from this book without any 
real sense of a challenge to the belief that conventional figures like Shelley, 
Byron, Tennyson, and Browning were, for conventional reasons, the great 
writers of the nineteenth century, and that working-class critics did well to 
acknowledge this. If Murphy wants to contend that a working-class criticism 
reached its maturity in a "new emphasis on Beauty-in life and in poetry" 
(135), without compromising its political commitment, he might have consid-
ered the view of some historians (for example, Trygve Tholfsen) that the in-
creasing tendency over the course of the nineteenth century for working-class 
movements to endorse values like respectability and improvement involved 
an unfortunate assimilation to middle-class values. The field of literary value 
need not support this model of appropriation or co-option, but it would seem 
to be a crucial place to test it. 
California Institute of Technology Kevin Gilmartin 
..J,~. __________________________________ __ 
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Ecological Literary Criticism: Romantic Imagining and the Biology of Mind by Karl 
Kroeber. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Pp. 185. $16.00, paper. 
The plenitude of new books and articles on relationships between litera-
ture and ecology are a welcome sign that literary criticism need not be di-
vorced from political issues and contemporary scientific concerns, and that 
literatures and their criticism may have significant things to say in those 
areas. The relationship between Romantic studies and ecology is a case in 
point, exemplified here by Karl Kroeber's original, stimulating book. 
In general, Kroeber presents the scientific and epistemological dimensions 
of current ecological theories as ways of redrawing the reader's map of fa-
miliar poems by the Romantics. There is an early but rather short chapter on 
ecofeminism, again from the point of view of the politics of scientific re-
search, which is not quite blended into the whole work. Kroeber's fourth 
chapter deals with the consequences of ecology for poetics. He advocates 
that poetry be read holistically, as a sort of ecosystem within other systems 
of political and natural life. Other sections of the book deal with ways in 
which modern and postmodern sciences related to ecology, such as chaos 
theory, can be brought to bear upon our understanding of Romantic poetry. 
At a 1992 MLA panel hosted by Alan Liu, Karl Kroeber asserted that Ro-
mantic ecological literary criticism was reforging Romantic criticism in the 
wake of what he described as "Cold War criticism." He declared that he had 
been inspired by what could be deemed a paradigm shift instigated by Jona-
than Bate's 1990 study of Wordsworth, Romantic Ecology. Bate himself had 
been encouraged by Kroeber's own suggestions about ways of reading Ro-
mantic poetry ecologically. The late eighties and early nineties were a time 
of ecological shifts in both popular and academic ideologies in Europe and 
America. In Romantic studies, notable work was produced in this area not 
only by Bate and Kroeber but also by writers like Jeffrey Robinson, whose 
seminal The Walk (1989) is also an ecological ur-text. By the 1995 conference 
of the North American Society for Studies in Romanticism, "ecocriticism," 
ecological criticism and its cognates had made an a scholarly impact large 
enough to warrant not only Bate's fresh, coherent ecological re-reading of 
Keats' "To Autumn," but also at least two panels with ostensibly ecological 
themes, attended by Alan Bewell, Onno Oerlemans, Mark Lussier and my-
self. Moreover, ecology was a theme which threaded its way through many 
conversations. 
In a welcome spirit of detente inspired perhaps by the recent frontal at-
tacks on the academy by the Republican right, what Kroeber had called 
"Cold War criticism" four years ago established a productive dialogue with 
ecocriticism. David Simpson, whom Kroeber might well call an exemplar of 
the former, engaged Jonathan Bate in dialogue in both his and Bate's plenary 
sessions. The dialogue was about the need to establish some critical middle 
ground which would assuage the excessive encroachments of localism in 
postmodern intellectual work. Ecological politics, after all, is about thinking 
globally and acting locally. As that politics was a product of the New Left in 
the 1960s as well as of emergent Romantic and post-Romantic discourses 
about nature, it only seems fair that in the long run "Cold War criticism" 
might not be so very much estranged from what I have been calling ecocriti-
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cism. The implicit anti-nuclear politics suggested by the very phrase, Cold 
War criticism, serves to justify this assertion. 
None of this could easily be assumed, however, if one's only access to 
Romantic ecocriticism were Karl Kroeber's Ecological Literary Criticism. As a 
critic of left historicist readings of Romantic literature, Kroeber repeats the 
charges he made in 1992 in the third chapter of the book. There seems to be 
no possibility of agreement between the over-reaching culturalism of certain 
historicist literary critical methods, and Kroeber's I-refute-it-thus-sir ap-
proach: "no one old enough to remember life before antibiotics will march 
under the new historicist banner 'There is no nature.' Nor should anyone 
who has encountered a forest fire, sailed on the ocean, or been out in a mid-
dle-western thunderstorm" (42). 
Much of the book attempts to re-frame our reading of familiar Romantic 
literary works by using contemporary developments in ecology, biology, 
neurophysiology ("the biology of mind" is most urgently present in a discus-
sion of Neural Darwinism), physics and mathematics. In addition, however, 
many of these ostenSibly descriptive and refreshingly exploratory passages 
are prefaced or underpinned by explicitly ideological prescriptive language, 
often critical of what Kroeber construes as the left in some fonn or another, 
an irony that may not be lost on those very historicist critics accused of drag-
ging extraneous ideological baggage into their close readings of Words-
worth. There is an anti-intellectual current in the accusatory tone which 
ought, really, to sit uneasily with the extolling of present-day science. "The 
romantics," writes Kroeber in the introduction, "never forgot what today we 
too frequently overlook, that the most important elements of our environ-
ment are our fellow human beings~most of whom, thank goodness, are not 
academic critics" (21). 
Karl Kroeber's attacks are, however, allegedly carried out in a Blakean 
spirit of friendly opposition, made explicit in the dedication. Indeed, the 
most intriguing parts of this new look at canonized authors subtly interpene-
trate the logic of academic debate, in a way that does strive to find a ne\v 
critical voice responsive to the at once obvious, but surprisingly unfamiliar, 
discourses of namre in Romantic poetry. Very few, perhaps, have really 
known just how to deal with the seriousness and political sweep of this topic 
without tending either to dismiss it as a psychological charade or to wish it 
away as a cultural construct. Thus Kroeber's engaging chapter on Malthus 
and Shelley attempts to recast the most available of Romantic texts in a \vay 
that might do justice to "the interaffectivity of the political and the natural" 
(88). Points like this, at which a kind of literary critical judo comes into play, 
\vork much better than the more confrontational and heavy handed mo-
ments. 
It is not quite enough, hmvever, simply to shmv in the same chapter hO\\' 
"ivlalthus's and Keats's speculations resonate because both display a charac-
teristic romantic sense for the interdependence of mind and body conceived 
in a developing relationship with a dynamic environment" (83). All the 
buzzwords of the new biology are there, but there is something missing. 
(Once again, apropos of nothing, Shelley seems to have beaten everyone to 
the post with his insistence on neologisms that use the prefix "inter".) If I 
were to take issue with anything in Kroeber's book, it would be the rather 
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heady character of some of his readings, heavy on the cognitive, too light on 
the ethical and the aesthetic. In other words, poems are read as kinds of 
imaginatively charted science books, text books to be sure, but popularizing 
books on contemporary science. 
To compare Malthus and Keats in this fashion is to view their work from a 
great distance, as if looking through a telescope at the New Age section of a 
Boulder bookstore (of which there are many), and happening to see Roman-
tic poets jostling shoulders not with continental philosophers from Kant to 
Derrida but with an alternative tradition which does often hark back to Mal-
thus, and forwards to Fri~of Capra, the author of The Tao of Physics. This is 
despite the disclaimer that by equating ecology with holiness in 1974, Kroe-
ber did not seek to encourage any such "dim-witted and unpleasant mysti-
cisms" (53). Indeed, it is unfortunate that Kroeber re-employs Edelman's 
now-discredited idea of "bootstrapping," or self-reconfiguration, in his read-
ing of Shelley's "The Triumph of Life" (l07). "Bootstrapping" is also still cu-
riously present in a recent re-edition of The Tao of Physics, which popularized 
the idea in the first place. Moreover, Kroeber's mixture of quantum and 
chaos theory betrays a lack of understanding which is also typical of New 
Age writers. Chaos is most clearly observed in the context of Newtonian me-
chanics, not the more recent ways of understanding the universe whose epis-
temological and ethical dominance Kroeber traces back to the Romantic 
imagination. Such admixtures are "not even wrong," as Wolfgang Pauli 
might declare. In Kroeber's defence it can, and has been claimed that the 
quantum Shelley is a serious, or at least seriously playful, notion. But to as-
sume that Malthus and Keats can both be summed up in a way similar to a 
summary of the ontology of a new biologist like Rupert Sheldrake, is to per-
form a rhetorical move similar to the last two decades' fascination with mar-
keting eastern spirituality and subatomic physics in a magical blend of 
ecotopianism and the technocultures of contemporary scientific research. By 
Sidestepping Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx, for example, Tyler Volk, a biologist 
at NYU, has recently demonstrated parallelisms between the patterns found 
in nature, those discovered in the sexiest postmodern sciences and the wis-
dom of ancient philosophies. His book Metapatterns begs one question from 
the outset: when is a pattern ever not "meta" in some sense? Kroeber's work 
follows a similar path, attempting to show the "meta" at work in discourses 
which have widely differing readerships, conditions of authorship and ef-
fects in the polis. For example, Kroeber compares Shelley'S fascination for 
"seemingly random processes" both with hventieth century science's interest 
in chaos and catastrophe, and with BacheIard's speculations on "con-
sciousness as fundamentally an 'open process'" (139). It is possible that 
Kroeber's understanding of the intricacy of these processes matches Yolk's 
feel for Blake, when he adds his own couplet to "Auguries of Innocence," 
which he interprets in an ecological fashion: "Beer can by side of road, / 
Gets me ready to explode" (Volk, Mclal'allel"lls, 69). 
\Vhat is the reason for this avoidance of the usual philosophical and her-
meneutic moves? Kroeber, Volk and others share a postmodern, New Age 
conCl'rn for the ravJges of whJt has come to be tarred and feathered as "the 
Enlightenment." Likewise, many New Age cultures are genuine uttempts to 
CfetlLL' alternati\·e ways of producing, consuming and recording reality: w<lys 
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that do not seek to dominate nature or the human spirit, in their terms. It is 
something which they share with certain facets of postwar criticism and criti-
cal theory, notably the work of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School in general. 
But it is intellectually unsafe in a study of Romantic culture to bypass mod-
ernity altogether. Kroeber is conscious of this at a crucial point in his reading 
of Shelley's "The Triumph of Life," a significant document in the debate 
about whether Romanticism was pro-, anti- or simply post-Enlightenment: 
Shelley is figured as "for both good and ill, an inheritor of the Enlightenment 
ethos within an anti-Enlightenment poem" (104). Kroeber is to be admired 
for this statement, but it is somewhat anomalous in the context of the gen-
eral argument. 
It is difficult to criticize the Enlightenment, however, if the philosophical 
and theoretical baby is thrown out with the politically coercive and ecologi-
cally manipulative bathwater. One must perforce resort to an easy kind of 
intuitive, touchy-feely rhetorical mode which simply by juxtaposition aims 
to show the interconnectedness of certain ideas. Argument by contiguity is 
itself a relic of "Cold War criticism/' the long march from the rediscovery of 
invented traditions of eastern mysticism and the long-haired version of rug-
ged individualism, to books which popularize the Gaia hypothesis and self-
actualization techniques. 
Kroeber rejuvenates a sense of materialism with which the Romantics 
might be readf but it is not the materialislll of Marx. Paradoxically, it is more 
like that of Feuerbach, one of those Enlightenment thinkers whom Marx 
rounds uponf and upon whom one might expect Kroeher to exercise harsh 
judgement. But the Feuerbachian tone has another genealogy. One note 
sounded throughout Ecological Literary Criticism is a form of metaphysical 
materialism which rewrites Spinoza as a forerunner of renewed conceptions 
of the universe as the indestructible circulation of matter or energy (depend-
ing which side of the uncertainty principle you are on at the time of observa-
tion) (58-61). But simply to know that this is the case is somewhat 
disappointing. It is similar to the effect of the lectures which the Zen Bud-
dhist apologist Alan Watts gave in later life to audiences of noncommitted 
theology students, about how Buddhist philosophy was really concerned 
with a form of eco-zen that proclaimed the oneness of organism and environ-
ment. This may be so, and it is remarkable in many ways that an author in 
the field of literary criticism has come close to emulating some of these rhe-
torical moves. But a sense of oneness is not enough to help us with the 
kitchen-sink level problems with which ecology so rigorously confronts us, 
and which Kroeber makes much of in this book, like the population issue. 
Nor is it particularly helpful to know that we are all related on a plane of 
materiality. 
Enlightenment epistemology has been making similar moves for the last 
hvo hundred years, and from Romanticism through theosophy and nmv 
Ne,v Age, has been touching its a-rational Other and throwing down its de-
fences. The population issue will not be solved with a "ne",.r" epistemology, 
not because it is irrefutably "out there" in empirical or natural space, but be-
cause the world is too much with us. It is curiously Eurocentric to see it as 
purely a problem of epistemological perspective. After all, that ,vas Malthus' 
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way of arguing that relief for the poor was a waste of resources. 
University of Colorado, Boulder Timothy Morton 
Aubrey Beardsley, Dandy of the Grotesque by Chris Snodgrass. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. xix + 338. $45.00. 
Aubrey Beardsley (1872-1898) was the most literary visual artist of the 
1890s. During a six and one-half professional career interrupted and ulti-
mately cut short by tuberculosis, he illustrated stories in the Pall Mall Budget 
and the Pall Mall Magazine; Le Marte Darthur; the Bon-Mots, tluee volumes of 
witty sayings by eighteenth-century writers and stage directors; Lucian's 
Strange History; Oscar Wilde's Salome; title pages for twenty-one volumes in 
the Keynote series of novels as well as various eighteenth and nineteenth-
century French and English novels; Alexander Pope's Rape of the Lock, Theo-
phile Gautier's Mademoiselle de Maupin; posters for the stage and for 
publishers' series of novels; and Ben Jonson's Volpone, on which he was 
working when he died. He also executed book plates, wrote as well as illus-
trated The Story of Venus and Tiinnhauser, his spoof of pornography, and was 
the art editor of two avant garde periodicals, The Yellow Book and The Savoy. 
When he died at the age of twenty-five and one-half, Beardsley left approxi-
mately 1100 draWings (including juvenilia) and fascinating, sometimes be-
wildering, interpretations of the material he was commissioned or chose to 
"picture," his term for illustrating a work. It is the bewildering quality of the 
drawings, their structure, that Chris Snodgrass has set himself to explore, 
and he does so carefully and successfully. 
With this book, Snodgrass intends "within the personal and historical con-
texts of [Beardsley's] life to try to extrapolate the logic and thematic struc-
tures that informed [his] pictures" (viii). To do so, he bases this study on 
three major foci: that Beardsley's drawings defeat a "univocal" reading (30), 
that Beardsley craved a father figure, and that Beardsley patterned his life 
and art after the dandy created by the eighteenth-century Beau Brummel. 
The result is a fascinating but uneven study which, in the fashion of Beard-
sley's drawings, oscillates between the life and the art. 
Snodgrass originally published his striking theory of the structure of 
Beardsley'S drawings in a 1989 collection of essays about the artist. There, he 
located with precision the contradictory impulses in the draWings. In this 
book and without the critical jargon of the essay, he has the leisure to extend 
his thesis, and he continues to pinpoint the ways Beardsley's drawings work 
as he compellingly "reads" many of them, those well-known and those much 
less known. His eye is clear and most of the time unerring about work which 
created consternation in its own time, yet which, even as it began to be re-
produced, influenced the MacDonald sisters and Charles Rennie Mackintosh 
in Scotland and continues to influence artists in various media. Indeed, for 
explaining the ways in which these drawings defeat a final, univocal reading 
-Beardsley's contribution to the grotesque-----Snodgrass deserves much 
credit. 
n 
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His attempt to relate these drawings to Beardsley'S life, however, is less 
successful, for two reasons. First, his anxiety about his thesis causes him to 
be dogmatic. It appears less in statements such as Beardsley "wished to cri-
tique canonical traditions" (97) and that he "strives to posit authenticating 
univocal values" (160)-without any real proof-than in overlooking alterna-
tive theories. The difficulty in writing about Beardsley's life and his ideas is 
that we know very little about him, despite comments recorded by his con-
temporaries. He was nineteen years old and untrained when he arrived in 
London from the provincial town of Brighton. When he sprang into success, 
he caused immediate jealousy among established artists, who had corne up 
through the ranks and were trained in their craft. Young enough to want to 
create a towering reputation and, in light of his illness, to do it quickly, he 
provoked his audience by including in his drawings sexual details. These 
outraged the public and presented critics and jealous artists with the oppor-
tunity to praise his line and denigrate his treatment of subject matter, a gen-
eral sentiment which culminated in Beardsley's removal from The Yellow 
Book in the 1895 wake of Wilde's arrest and which established the twin lines 
of criticism scholars followed in the years after his death. 
Moreover, unlike many of these men, Beardsley left no memoir nor did he 
discuss his artistic intentions; indeed, his major focus was to see his draw-
ings reproduced and disseminated in the little time he knew was allotted to 
him. His collected letters (1970) leave the seminal impression of a young 
man struggling to face death with grace and humor. They also reveal a large 
gap: during 1894-95, which Max Beerbohm described as the Beardsley 
Boom, only 34 published letters dated 1894 and 83 dated 1895 appear-in a 
volume which runs to 441 pages. Did Beardsley not have time to write in 
1894? Did John Lane, as Mark Samuels Lasner believes, acquire the 1895 let-
ters in order to destroy the record of Beardsley's thoughts about being dis-
missed from the magazine he had helped so successfully to launch? We will 
probably never know, but a biographer must take into account these and 
other problems (such as the fact that his two separately acquired libraries 
were never catalogued) which the minor amount of first hand commentary 
present. 
Instead, Snodgrass insists on only one interpretation, as with Beardsley'S 
life. For example, in asserting that Beardsley's life was patterned by a need 
for authority and control, he overlooks alternative speculations. One example 
occurs when he posits established artists as authority or father figures with-
out considering the possibility that a young artist, new to London and with-
out connections in the art world, would crave their acceptance or that, as an 
untrained artist, he needed to surpass them. Another surfaces in connection 
with Beardsley and money. Towards the end of his life, following doctors' 
orders and travelling from city to city, hotel to hotel, in search of an accomo-
dating climate for his diseased lungs, Beardsley lived on Andre Raffalovich's 
patronage, £100 per quarter, on a £25 per week salary from Leonard Smith-
ers, his last publisher (of which he regularly received only £10), and on the 
proceeds of the sale of his drawings to Herbert Pollitt. The total may have 
been more than adequate if one discounts doctors' fees, hotel costs, and the 
necessities of living for himself and his mother who nursed him. Snodgrass 
may be correct in viewing Beardsley's behavior as constituted by a "mania 
-J~ ________________________________ __ 
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for control [which made him act] as if he were in serious financial trouble at 
times when there was no longer any crisis" (134). But another interpretation 
is plausible. By this time Beardsley knew his end was near; he writes about 
his depressed state of mind and fear to Pollitt, a relative stranger and (there-
fore?) the only one to whom he confided these emotions, "I am abominably 
ill. ... I am utterly done up" (27 November 1897; Letters 396), and in his last 
note, "a vile attack. ... has left me an utter wreck and quite incapable of 
work. ... Heavens know when I shall be able to work again. Pray breathe 
not a word of this to anyone . ... Such splendid things I had planned out too" 
(22 February 1898; Letters 436). Considering his will, which left all his money 
to his sister Mabel, it is possible to speculate that Beardsley wanted to leave 
Mabel, the only person Max Beerbohm and Arthur Symons tell us he was 
close to, better situated financially. Speculating about other possibilities 
would allay readers' concern that Snodgrass dismissed other ideas without 
considering them; equally, the presentation and dashing of alternatives 
would ground his own ideas more thoroughly. 
A second reason that this book is less successful than it could be occurs at 
the outset, when Snodgrass determines that he will assess the "continuing 
significance [of Beardsley'S work] as representatives of cultural change" (ix). 
Several examples stand out. In the discussion of Beardsley's ambiguity, a 
technique which becaIne a hallmark of twentieth-century art we never learn 
the way ambiguity connects with the dandy or contributes to that "cultural 
change." In addition, Snodgrass places Beardsley in the Victorian Decadence 
and repeatedly calls the artist a Decadent. But Symons flatly states that 
Beardsley hated the term, and we know that after breaking away from his 
n 
youthful influences, Burne-Jones and the Pre-Raphaelites, he allied himself ,I I 
with no groups. And in the two chapter discussion of the dandy, placed pen- :, i 
ultimately in the book, Snodgrass stresses Beardsley's patterning of his life 
and art on the dandy as created in the eighteenth century by Beau Brummel. 
The effect of excluding contemporary illustrators is to create a hermetic ar-
gument which looks only backwards. These are examples which contribute 
to placing Beardsley in the 1890s, but how do they assist the reader to see 
the "continuing significance . . . of cultural change"? 
Most problematical with accepting Beardsley as a Beau Brummel dandy, 
however, is the fact that the figure of the dandy did not remain static in the 
intervening century. Part of the dandy's change has to do with the influence, 
possibly equally important, of Bohemianism. By mid-century, Bohemianism 
meant living the life rather than doing the work; the concept changed by 
the 1890s. As the historian Jerrold Seigel argues in Bohemian Paris, Barbey 
d' Aurevilly, Baudelaire, VerIaine, and Jarry, to name only the best-known 
men, adapted the qualities of the eighteenth-century Beau Brummel dandy-
elegance, detachment, and self-containment-notably to include psychology, 
the recognition that "the boundary between art and the life of art could no 
longer be maintained" (Seigel 124), and the confrontation of the audience. If 
we accept Seigel's view, Beardsley's inheritance of the dandy, mutating 
through French adaptations and Bohemianism, is more complex and sug-
gests much more inherited cultural change than Snodgrass allows. 
As in any book, there are errors. Snodgrass accepts the received opinion 
that Wilde was Beardsley's nemesis (275) without apparently being aware 
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either of my 1992 musings on that relationship or those of Wilde's son Vy-
vyan, who was taken to see Beardsley before the artist's death and recorded 
his impressions in 1967. Beardsley did not create all the Salome drawings to 
be "irrelevant" (276), only the three substituted for those the publisher 
deemed too suggestive. The most serious errors, however, arise in relation to 
Beardsley's technique. In arguing Beardsley's need for perfection and con-
trol, Snodgrass accepts Rothenstein's belief that Beardsley erased "the un-
wanted penciled remnants [of his preparatory sketches] or obliterate[d] them 
in black masses" (129). As I have discovered during my preparation of the 
catalogue raisonne, however, Beardsley frequently left pencil lines. These 
range from a few, for example in the alteration of a tree branch or a hat, to 
many, as in Mrs. Pat Campbell and the title-page for The Yellow Book, Vol. 1, 
where he changed the entire location of the drawing on the page. A few 
pages later, using Brigid Brophy and John Black (not listed in the bibliogra-
phy) on another aspect of technique, Snodgrass states that Beardsley traced 
and retraced "details of images to get them exactly correct" (131). But Bear-
dsley used paper which was not thin enough to permit tracing, and the 
backs of drawings show neither indentations nor other evidence of hard lines 
necessarily left by tracing. 
In terms of production, the covers and the binding of the book are sturdy, 
and the dust jacket handsome and arresting. The text, however, suffers from 
being printed on thin paper; the print on the reverse of pages can be seen 
through the drawings. The reproductions create an additional problem. 
Beardsley'S drawings were meant to be reduced. In this text, they are often 
printed larger than they were meant to be, and some are blurry (for example, 
192, 193), Others, photographed from books without removing the screen, 
lose detall (for example, 48, 56, 215, 264, 265). 
Despite the lack of cohesion among the three foci, the weaknesses in the 
overall argument of this book, and an occaSionally pejorative tone directed at 
the artist, the readings of the drawings and the analysis of the their structure 
will delight Beardsley scholars. 
Morehouse College Linda G. Zatlin 
Narrative Ethics by Adam Zachary Newton. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995. Pp. 335. $39.95. 
There is much that merits praise in this critical study, not least its em-
phatic clarity of purpose and its own ethical integrity. Narrative Ethics is a 
sophisticated, often subtle meditation on literary ethics; poised against both 
humanistic pieties and deconstructive denunciations, it tries to retrieve for 
critical discourse the intense and even traumatic impact of literary experi-
ence, its power to change the sensibilities of its readers. In pursuing this aIm, 
Newton shows himself to be a reader of exemplary range and a comparatist 
of exceptional skill. His critiques of alternative versions of narrative ethics 
are precise and uncompromising, yet he takes from those exchanges a posi-
,~.---------------------------------------------------------------------
I~ 
486 Criticism, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 3: Book Reviews 
tive awareness of the expanded range of concerns-cultural, ideological, and 
linguistic-that a contempprary literary ethics must address. 
Newton's initial theoretical chapters begin by critiquing traditional narra-
tive ethics, which has typically meant one of two things. Either critics have 
located the ethical force of literature in the explicit messages of particular 
texts, treating its aims as explicit and doctrinaire moralism, or they have 
claimed that literature engenders a much broader (albeit vaguer) enhance-
ment of our moral capacities-expanding our empathy, our tolerance, our 
respect for difference. These options describe not just humanist criticism of 
one kind or another, but fit equally well with the skeptical, ascetic ethos of 
deconstruction or the moral imperatives of much cultural criticism. Both 
choices, Newton insists, have led to the neglect or impoverishment of narra-
tive ethics by denying it any independent "critical legitimacy" (27). 
To capture what traditional narrative ethics has left out, Newton relies 
most heavily on three central figures-Mikhail Bakhtin, Stanley Cavell, and 
Emmanuel Levinas-whose work provides a basis for exploring "the limit-
ing intersubjective conditions of the narrative imagination" (27). Bakhtin's 
dialogics provide him with an intersubjective model of language, whose 
speakers are forever caught up in a web of competing social discourses. Our 
awareness of this heteroglossia would ideally spark an ethical obligation that 
Bakhtin terms vzhival1ie or live-entering, "a mode of active engagement with 
the other which mediates betvveen identification or empathy on the one 
hand, and objective respect at a distance on the other" (85). Cavell's work 
specifies this demand in a slightly different way, as a desire for acknowledg-
ment that goes beyond mere understanding to validate the presence and 
worth of the other person. Although Newton criticizes Cavell's emphasis on 
the moral content of certain texts, he emphatically endorses the reversal of 
Hegel that places the claims of intersubjectivity above the claims of reason 
(5). 
Useful as Newton finds both Bakhtin and Cavell, it is Levinas's stress 
upon the affective intensities of intersubjective relations that matters most to 
his work. Levinas also contends that an encounter betvveen persons becomes 
ethical to the extent that each acknowledges the irreducible otherness of the 
other. "Morality begins with the separateness of persons" (309), and Newton 
draws from this claim the corollary principle that literary texts serve their 
most powerful ethical function when they "allegorize the crevasse dividing 
person from person, as well as the techniques they invent (for seeming) to 
traverse it" (45). Levinas differs most from Bakhtin and Cavell, however, by 
insisting that such encounters radically interrupt our day-to-day relations 
and remain irrecuperable in language; instead, "they shock and linger as 
'traumatisms of astonishment'" (13). Regardless of the good will that we 
may bring to them, they remain unsettling, even potentially violent. In Levi-
nas's own lerms, "The Other is the sale being that one can be tempted to kill. 
This temptation of murder and this impossibility of murder constitute the 
\'lTV vision of the face" (175). 
For all three theorists, then, intersubjectivity is both ontologically and ethi-
cally prior to subjectivity. They resist the idea that an antecedent self con-
sciouslv or rationally decides to enter into relC1tions with others. Instead, 
"The uisk of selfhood is proposed, called into being, from outside the self as 
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answerability" (45). Narrative both amplifies and reduces these encounters, 
preserving their traces, but never wholly overcoming the incommensura-
bility of seeing and telling, and erring if it fails to acknowledge its incapacity 
to do so. Hence one measure of our critical responsibility is how well we 
preserve the irreducible particularity of individual literary texts, avoiding 
the sorts of allegorical readings that treat characters or incidents solely as ex-
emplary types. 
Narrative Ethics succeeds in part because it enacts this dialogic responsibil-
ity in framing its own theoretical vision, developing its particular stance out 
of an ongoing debate with other critics. Narratology gets relatively brief at-
tention, since it has typically had little or no concern for the ethical conse-
quences of its structural or formal analyses. Newton's exchange with 
deconstruction is more persistent and intense, sympathetic in its assessment 
of deconstruction's value and yet incisive in its diagnOSiS of its limits. He 
concedes that deconstruction preserves the unsettling difference of literary 
texts, while objecting that it stops within the text, as if the reader never did 
re-emerge from it, never did retell it. This approach fails, then, to recognize 
the positive implications of the fragmented self, the opening out to others 
that can result from sensing this. Newton affirms Bakhtin's comment that, 
liThe seWs inner division is a sign of life, not estrangement, since it records 
the presence of others, the saving heterogeneity of consciousness" (47). Pre-
cisely because both narratology and deconstruction stop short of considering 
literature as a performative act, they allow literary ethics to be treated as if it 
could be reduced to relations of power, when in fact, "the face to face in its 
ethical mode dispels or neutralizes power; it appears always as 'a positive 
value'" (215). 
Newton is closer in purpose to the recent ethical criticism that he terms 
"neo-humanism," the work of such philosophers and critics as Nussbaum, 
Booth, and Altieri. Yet even these theorists, he contends, err in attempting to 
rationalize and systemalize the contingent purposes that predominate in lit-
erary texts. By conceiving the self as a relatively stable entity, they gloss over 
the tremendous uncertainties of the encounter, losing sight of its "immediacy 
of contact" (11) in their pursuit of meanings that readers can take away from 
such events. Furthermore, they tend to treat the assimilation of particular 
cases into universal rules as a relatively unproblematic process, so that their 
concern for the exemplary features of particular texts inevitably overrides 
the claims of those texts to singularity. Seeing a text as exemplary "misses 
the fact that it is meant first to be confronted" (66). 
Where should we locate the ethical core of literary texts instead? The dis-
tinctive orientation of Newton's narrative ethics involves seeing IInarrative 
as relationship and human connectivity, as Saying over and above Said, or as 
Said called to account in Saying" (7). Seeing and telling constitute for him an 
act of witnessing, a relational exchange that goes beyond assimilating what-
ever might be told. With greater or lesser success, all retellings of narrative 
strive to preserve the integrity of the encounter. "In life ... as authors of 
their own fragments, persons can only recognize one another through 
glimpse and approximation; they wait on the charity of narrative amplitude" 
(104). But that amplification must also be an exercise in hermeneutic self-
restraint, preserving the difference of the other as "a concrete and singular 
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other whose moral appeal precedes both decision and understanding" (12). 
We should, that is, be witnesses first and readers (or interpreters) second. 
Newton's narrative ethics resides secondly in the active reflection of narra-
tive texts on their own ethical potential, their thematizing of the act of narra-
tion. This emphaSis on the rnetafictional aspect of texts means that his 
method finds its fullest expression in modern or postmodern texts, where 
self-reflexivity is most often an integral part of the text's performance. 
The four chapters that follow this theoretical prelude canvass a range of 
ways of attending to others that Newton discerns in nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century authors. They often begin on familiar ground by demonstrating 
the self-referentiality of the texts in question, but gain momentum as they 
move toward delineating the gains and costs of inhabiting specific narra-
tional roles. Chapter 3 focuses on short texts by Conrad and Anderson, con-
sidering the constraints that inhibit full narration or full interpretation of 
another's story and underscoring the assumption, often only partial, by nar-
rators, listeners, and witnesses of the ethical obligations that go with the 
roles that they perform (128). The following chapter points out how an 
appeal to these obligations may arise outside an author's own intent; Henry 
James's tales reveal a representational ethics beyond narrator and author 
alike, where James becomes the unconscious critic of his o'WIl aesthetic om-
niscience (146). 
Chapter 5 takes up texts by Crane, Melville, and Wright in a marvelously 
compelling analysiS that projects Levinas's philosophical metaphorics of the 
face onto the theme of facelessness in texts by and about African Americans. 
Newton brilliantly demonstrates how the cultural erasure of black faces de-
stroys the possibilities for ethical encounter and~for black writers as well as 
white ones-turns black figures into monsters. The same conclusion can be 
drawn about Melville's Babo or even Wright's Bigger Thomas as about 
Crane's Henry Johnson in The Monster: "The text, in effect, exhausts Henry'S 
personhood through a relentless racial optics" (190). His disfigurement and 
monstrosity simply literalize and force into consciousness a condition that 
existed from the start. Remarkably fine practical literary criticism, this chap-
ter articulates as well as any comparable study how ethical criticism and cul-
tural criticism can productively converge. Newton's ethical perspective takes 
subtle account of the pervaSively dehumanizing consequences of racism, 
while showing how these same texts resist the reinscription of racial cate-
gories as primary. Newton refuses to draw any easy morals from these texts, 
as if these authors might be suggesting some recipe to neutralize racism. 
Here as throughout his volume, he reads these texts as defining problems, 
not solutions, and carrying within them all the latent violence of the cultural 
situations that they describe, Chapter 6 concludes Newton's survey by turn-
ing to the themes of secrecy and personal identity in texts by Dickens, 
Barnes, and Ishiguro. Questioning expressivist accounts of the foundational 
interiority of selfhood, Newton argues that "the telling or the hoarding of se-
crets serves as the glue which binds person to person" (247). 
Newton's dogged insistence upon the vividness and hermeneutic depths 
of these emblematic literary encounters is admirable, yet leaves a lingering 
question: what follows from this? Most fundamentally, his narrative ethics 
has an injunctive force, calling on us to adopt a specific attitude toward texts 
Il 
I 
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(and toward other persons as well): a "critical tact" toward the absoluteness 
of their difference from one another and from us. Citing Richard Brudney, 
Newton clearly agrees that moral deliberation is "a craft, rather than a reflec-
tion on the nature of moral rules" (68). 
Yet it is not so self-evident that we have to make an either-or choice here 
between craft and science, between tact and knowledge, Nor is it clear that 
an emphatic separation of these alternatives really fits our reading purposes 
and practices better than a vision that tries, however clumsily, to oscillate 
between them. Does the stunned astonishment of Levinas really provide us 
with a full narrative ethics, or only with an affective sensibility that-how-
ever fundamental it may be-must eventually give way to a more formal-
ized ethics or perhaps cease to be ethical at all? It is telling in this regard that 
Newton's examples are all essentially negative, markers of the difficulties 
that stand in the path of ethical encounter. Just as "Lord Jim can only work in 
tenus of successive mediations, partial disclosures" and thus remams "not 
fully 'Levinasian,'" (89-90), and as Winesburg, Ohio "depicts a primitive and 
partial, let us say pre-Levinasian world" (106), so, too, do the texts of Crane, 
Melville, and Wright only "negatively confirm an ethical principle by con-
spicuously violating it" (227). Nor does it seem likely that other literary ex-
amples would tell a different story. It is not so much that Newton's ethical 
model for literary discourse remains only partially articulated here; it is in a 
fundamental sense inarticulable. Conrad's texts are symptomatic in being 
about "the redemptiveness of inarticulacy, the ethical claim of the unfinal-
ized text" (103). Yet what besides our attention is it claiming? Can that atten-
tion in and of itself really suffice? 
While the texts Newton favors do ask a bit more, valorizing the capacity 
for dialogue that narrators such as Conrad's Marlow or Dickens' Inspector 
Bucket embody, what such dialogue might mean in a given context remains 
-by necessity it would seem-perfectly open. The narrator of Anderson's 
"The Philosopher" "infuses a kind of grace into his fragmentary and ellipti-
cal stories by asking merely that they be followed" (120). Quite right, one 
might agree, but then? Levinas's answer, that we should proceed from the 
"traumatism of astonishment" to the '''idea of infinity' produced by the 
other in me" (204) is at one and the same time tremendously uplifting and 
terribly vague. And one wonders whether a salutary critique of the limits of 
rational ethics hasn't become a more problematic displacement of rationality 
itself. To return to one of Newton's own key terms, what would the price of 
abiding within a purely Levinasian ethics be? Leaving us poised upon fun-
damental questions, though, may not be the least of the virtues of this chal-
lenging text. Narrative Ethics is by any account a serious and Significant 
contribution to the discussion of literary ethics, a field of inquiry where even 
now all too few texts of comparable rigor and intensity can be found. 
University of Washington Gary Handwerk 
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"Antike Roman": Power Symbology and the Roman Play in Early Modern England, 
1585-1635 by Clifford Ronan. Athens and London: University of Georgia 
Press, 1995. Pp. xiii + 233. 12 illustrations. $50.00. 
This book is a lively and learned survey of Roman materials as employed 
by the literature, especially the dramatic literature, of the Tudor-Stuart 
period. Written in an engaging style, and ranging knowledgeably through 
many scholarly fields, including painting and illustration, it covers a large 
number of subtopics, endeavoring to show how every feature of ancient 
Rome, real or imagined, functioned to express and represent some equiva-
lent or related feature of life in early modern England. Actually, at least in 
this case, the term "Renaissance" seems not only easier to use but more ap- I' 11 
propriate.) The method is obliquely related to that of J. V. Cunningham in 
Woe or Wonder; that is, certain key words or significant terms are explored to 
reveal their extended associations, either latent or patent, with the cultural 
background of the age. 
Several theoretical points are made. At one juncture (50-51) Ronan appears 
poised to resist the current insistence on the political topicality of Renais-
sance theatre, though this argument is eventually abandoned. At other 
points, Ronan, as E. R. Dodds had done before him with the Greeks, stresses 
the violent and irrational side of Rome's supposedly self-restrained culture 
(a side which was already familiar to the Renaissance). The treatment of 
anachronism in the early chapters of the book is very interesting. Of greatest 
importance to the present reviewer is Ronan's argument that there is occa-
sionally a hollow and even antic undertone in some of the Roman plays. This 
section (3-7) goes far to support by analogy my own revisionist reading of 
Macbeth in Identity and Community (chapter IV). 
A summary of the topics covered in this volume, from general features 
such as stoicism through special forms of behavior such as suicide, to highly 
specific notions such as the putative vulpine characteristics of the Romans, 
may be found on 152-55. There are a dozen illustrations, and the appendices 
include a short-title list of Roman plays from 1407 to 1651, as well as various 
statistical tables. 
Most readers, I suspect, will quickly find objections to the organization of 
the book. The lively and witty style, the often curious and esoteric subject-
matter, seem out of keeping with a form that strikes one at times as careless. 
The author does not seem to have put as much effort into finding an appro-
priate structure for the exposition of his materials as he has put into the de-
tails. Nor is there any discernible overarching thesis or major conclusion to 
bring the miscellaneous facts and observations together. On the other hand, 
if one stops to think how one might oneself have organized such a book, no 
obvious improvement springs to mind. It is a compendium, and clearly a 
useful one; to force a thesis on it would not have strengthened it or made it 
more useful. One might have put the most interesting materials in the book, 
which appear in the Introduction and Part One, at the end rather than at the 
beginning; but the work is basically a scholarly guide to a certain body of in-
formation rather than a structured argument, and to rearrange its contents 
would not have altered its essential character. It can be used, enjoyed, and 
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appreciated as presented. 
State University of New York at Buffalo Irving Massey 
Jews in Today's German Culture by Sander L. Gilman. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995. Pp. 132. $24.95. 
Although Sander Gilman's focus is on Jews in united Germany since the 
fall of the wall in 1989, he roams far and wide in history, drawing significant 
connections to the past to show how Jewish culture has gradually been re-
constituted in post-Shoah Germany. Indeed, there is today a thriving and 
complex Jewish social and cultural life in Germany, and Gilman traces its 
unique contours so that we can gain a sense of how difficult it is to be Jew-
ish in a country that practically denies Jewish existence as German. In this 
respect, Gilman's short but rich study is "must" reading for anyone inter-
ested in the trials and tribulations of Jewish life in Germany during the 
1990s. 
Jews in Today's German Culture is divided into three chapters: 1) "Jewish 
Self-Consciousness and Awareness of Jews in Post-Wall Germany"; 2) 
"Jewish Writing in its German and Jewish Contexts"; 3) "Representing Jew-
ish Sexuality." In his introduction, Gilman positions Jews in Germany by ex-
plaining the distinction between the Diaspara (the involuntary exile of the 
Jews) and the Galut (the voluntary dispersion of the Jews). "The very as-
sumption of the Diaspora is ambiguous and contradictory, even though it 
carries the force of divine revelation incorporated in texts. The Galut, on the 
other hand, is often understood as the experienced reality of being in exile, 
structured, however, by the internalization of the textual notion of the Dias-
pora tempered by the daily experience (good and bad) of life in the world. 
The Jew experiences the daily life of 'exile' through the mirror of the biblical 
model of the expulsion-whether it be the expulsion from the Garden of 
Eden or captivity in Egypf' (6). For Gilman, the Diaspora and Galut models 
are helpful for explaining the situation of Jews in post-Shoah Germany par-
ticularly since there have been different stages in the formation of Jewish 
communities in Germany, and the experiences of the younger Jews differ 
markedly from those of their parents and grandparents. While Jews may not 
have wanted to remain in Germany after 1945, most have remained volun-
tarily, and many have emigrated to Germany and made it their homeland. 
Yet, there is also a "diasporic" quality to their lives due to the sense of isola-
tion from mainstream German culture. 
In Chapter one, "Jewish Self-consciousness and awareness of Jews in Post-
Wall Germany," Gilman describes how Jews have come to occupy a very bi-
zarre position in contemporary Germany: they are both visible and invisible 
in a negative symbiosis with German culture. That is, they are at one with 
German culture but also resist it by pointing to the differences between Ger-
mans and Jews whether they be religious, cultural, or social. Of course, such 
a self-conscious position may not be typical of every Jew in Germany-and 
there are many different types of Jews-but it is at the heart of the literary 
;I,~. _______________ _ 
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self-representation of numerous Jewish writers. On the other hand, Germans 
do not really see Jews as Jews because they have become so integrated into 
German culture, and this benign neglect constitutes the "invisibility" of the 
Jews, who can choose to be as visible or invisible as they want. For Germans, 
most Jews are dead Jews or they are identified with their putative homeland, 
Israel. A real Jew for them is not a German but some type of Other. Today, 
the Other is more clearly represented by the Turks, Gypsies, Pakistanis, and 
Vietnamese because of their different physical features or clothing. Jews are 
more questionable because they look like Germans, and yet their allegiance 
is allegedly with Israel. 
Having described the tenuous situation of Jews in Germany, their visible 
invisibility, Gilman moves in his next chapter, "Jewish Writing in Its Ger-
man and Jewish Contexts/' to explain how contemporary Jewish authors 
have forged a kind of minor literature, a category developed by Gilles De-
leuze and Felix Guattari in their book, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Like 
Kafka, but certainly not as compelling, the young Jewish writers in Germany 
use the cultural traditions of the world around them to define themselves, 
but they also undermine and question these traditions to demonstrate how 
they are different from it. Here Gilman uses two authors of the third genera-
tion, Rafael Seligmann and Esther Dischereit, as his prime examples of how 
r 
Jewish writers personally contend with their experiences of growing up in ' 
post-Shoah Germany to designate their paradoxical situations. Gilman's dis- )' 
cussions of Seligmann's Rubinstein's Auction (1988) and The Yiddish Mama I.:.' 
(1990) and Dischereit's Joemi's Table: A Jewish Story (1988) and Merryn (1992) 
reveal the complex problems faced by these writers (and others like Jurek 
Becker and Maxim Biller) in their endeavors to make their Jewish identities 
visible to a large German-reading public-and to other Jews as well. 
For Gilman, the most common, distinguishing mark of Jewish identity in 
Jewish writing is the damaged body as the image of the damaged soul, and 
it is symbolically represented through images of circumcision or the Jewish 
star. In his final chapter, "Representing Jewish sexuality," he traces different 
theories of circumcision as they developed from Biblical times to the present. 
He then covers a wide range of contemporary Jewish writers (including 
American and English, male and female) to demonstrate how circumcision is 
used in different ways as the mark of their characters' sense of isolation and 
distance from the Aryan body. While some of the German Jewish writers 
maintain that the damaged body of the Jew cannot be made whole in con-
temporary Germany, because their self-doubts are aggravated by racial ten-
sions and xenophobia, a good many, according to Gilman, maintain that 
Jews have no choice but acculturation if they choose to remain in the Galut. 
As one of the first studies of contemporary Jewish culture in Germany, 
Gilman's fascinating book presents provocative theses that need greater at-
tention. Indeed, he himself has edited with Karen Remmler another impor-
tant study, Reemerging Jewish Culture in Germany (New York University 
Press, 1994), which covers many other aspects of contemporary Jewish expe-
riences that concern theater, film, religion, and politics in greater detail. Gil-
man's great strength lies in his incisive interpretation of the psychological 
dilemma of contemporary Jewish writers within a changing socio-historical 
context. Most important, his book is also a superb testimony, a witnessing of 
1-' 
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the vital resurgence of an unusual Jewish culture in todays torn but united 
Germany. 
University of Minnesota Jack Zipes 
Terrible Honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920's by Ann Douglas. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995. pp. xiii + 606 $25.00. 
In 1977 Ann Douglas made an impact on American Studies with The Fem-
inization of American Culture. While a few reviewers found it a bit too dis-
dainful of popular fiction by nineteenth-century American women writers 
who were then getting their first real scholarly attention, the book made a 
very significant contribution to critical discourse of the next decade. Accord-
ing to Douglas, the replacement of a virile Calvinist culture with a market-
oriented sentimentalism, in which the middle-class woman writer and a 
weakened and euphemistically inclined clergy were the guiding forces, was 
the dominant tendency in nineteenth-century American popular culture. As 
she summarizes her own theme two decades later, it was to document lithe 
matriarchal ethos at work in the arenas of reform, theology, literature, and 
gender definition." 
Now comes Douglas'S second book, a large and informative tome based 
on wide reading and reflection and generally a delight to read. Terrible Hon-
esty, which takes its title from a phrase of Raymond Chandler's, is a study of 
two intersecting thrusts in New York-and, more generally, American-cul-
ture. One is the creative contribution of African Americans to cultural life of 
the 1920's, the creative interactions in the arts then between black and white 
in America1 and America's "celebration of its black-and-white heritage/' that 
developed along with the "cultural emancipation of America from foreign 
influences." The second is a psychoanalytic paradigm, what Douglas sees as 
a matricidal impulse mostly on the part of white writers and artists, in effect 
the killing off of the Titaness, the "powerful white middle-class matriarch of 
the recent Victorian past," whose coming to power Douglas, of course, had 
narrated in The Feminization of American Culture. 
The historical chapters on black and white writers and musicians are the 
most conVincing and interesting, although they are based less on original re-
search than on an intelligent and widely ranging synthesiS of masses of ex-
isting scholarship on the Harlem Renaissance and modern American culture. 
One of the assets of the book, in fact, is a remarkable bibliographical essay at 
the end which will be a splendid resource for future students of the period. 
The chapters themselves include assessments of the intersection between ar-
tistic and political issues as seen in, for example, the at times quite negative 
influence of the female suffrage movement---often racist in practice-on 
black progress, the ambivalent relationships between new white immigrant 
groups and African Americans, and the Silent Protest Parade of 1917. They 
include concisely informative passages on ragtime, blues, and jazz with well 
chosen anecdotes on such artists as Mamie Smith, Eubie Blake, and Bessie 
Smith, mixed with similar sketches of Irving Berlin, Fred Astaire, or Bix Bei-
..... 
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derbecke. The psychoanalytic argument too often seems forced. Perhaps that 
is because it rests on our taking Douglas's first book as the fundamental op-
erating assumption of the second, on our taking the ascension of the Titaness 
and the feminization of culture as the main pattern of nineteenth-century 
America. Even those scholars most enthusiastic about that book, however, 
may feel that it is made too prominent a pretext for Terrible Honesty. It is not 
clear, moreover, but for the Freudian and Jamesian trappings, that the argu-
ment is significantly different at its core from older arguments about the 
rejection or displacement of Victorianism or Puritanism or some other pre-
war "ism" by the post-war or Lost or Jazz or Roaring Twenties generation. 
Then again, the discussion of three influential "Outside Insiders" as Douglas 
calls them-Freud, William James, and Gertrude Stein-seems inadequately 
integrated into what follows, except as it allows her, at opportune moments, 
to seize on an idea from their vvritings-such as James's notion of the "return 
of the repressed" -to clarify a pattern in her narrative. Finally, Douglas 
forces her case too often in asserting, not showing, some of her claims, such 
as that parricidal patterns are really matricidal underneath, or that knowing 
Freud was more profoundly affected by the matricidal theme of the Oresteia 
than by the parricidal theme of the Oedipus story, about which he published 
more fully, can help clarify the pathology of America's 1920's. Similarly, to 
argue that the Great War, like so much in the decade that followed, became 
a war against the mother is to lump a diverse medley of cultural, economic, 
and political values under the name "Mother" that might as easily have been 
called something else. 
Douglas's contention is that her two patterns are intertwined. Liberation of 
African American cultural life into a broader environment, simultaneous 
with the emergence of the United States as a world power, depended on or 
at least took place in tandem with the overthrow of the Victorian matriarch 
and with all the resulting irreverence of the decade. When New York be-
came the city where the action was, and when the United States became an 
economic power and also began to reverse the cultural flow that even in the 
1920' s sent American writers off to Europe, and when African American 
writers and musicians became public figures and partners with white artists 
in the rich cultural life of the decade, then displacement of the nineteenth-
century Titaness was an underlying factor-although whether causal agent 
or result is not always clear. Whether the thesis is necessary for us to under-
stand the activities and episodes Douglas so engagingly and meaningfully 
presents is doubtful; even whether it guides us toward significant new in-
sights about them is questionable. 
There is a looseness about the book that is both strength and weakness. It 
allows Douglas to draw connections between diverse cultural phenomena, 
but also leaves a reader at times wondering how to connect some parts with 
each other. A discussion of Neo-Orthodox theology in the second chapter 
seems disconnected from almost everything else, except perhaps as an exam-
ple of the repudiation of the genteel religion and "Pollyana" fiction of the 
previous generation. A long discussion of mind-cure movements, including 
Christian Science and the obsession of Mark Twain and Freud with Mary 
Baker Eddy, while connected in the text to a section on James and his, in ef-
fect, anti-Hegelian feminization of psychological inqUiry-itself passe in the 
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highbrow pessimism of the more Freudian 1920's-;seems conveniently irrel-
evant once Douglas's topic becomes the Harlem Renaissance. There is, per-
haps surprisingly, almost no reference to the visual arts, which were lively in 
New York in the decade. The literary sections are strong and very fair in de-
tailing the ambivalent relationships of writers like Zora Neale Hurston and 
Langston Hughes to patrons such as Nancy Cunard, Charlotte Mason, and 
Carl Van Vechten, and in assessing the role in the Harlem Renalssance of 
writers such as Wallace Thurman, Nella Larsen, and Countee Cullen. While 
there is a section on the importance of non-New Yorkers such as T. S. Eliot 
and Ernest Hemingway to New York intellectual life, and an obligatory cov-
erage of the Algonquin group and Eugene O'Neill, there is no indication of 
the Significance of contributions from newer immigrant groups as reflected 
in the work of Abraham Cahan, Anzia Yezierska, or Michael Gold. 
In some ways Terrible Honesty is like the books Howard Mumford Jones 
used to write, such as 0 Strange New World and The Age of Energy, full of fas-
cinating information brought together in an engaging narrative without a 
radically new persuasive rethinking or resynthesis of a period. The Age of En-
ergy, in fact, covers the period just prior to that discussed by Douglas, and 
energy is also a theme of hers, energy as a key to the new successes and 
pathologies in American culture, to modem manias, to the connection be-
tween the psychologies of Freud and James, who both valorized energy. The 
book has something in common even with the older literary surveys by Van 
Wyck Brooks such as The Flowering of New England and The Confident Years: 
1885-1915, the latter of which again like Jones's book covers the period pre-
ceding Douglas's and as with Jones's notion of "energy" seems, with 
"confidence," to provide a metaphor as useful to this study of the 1920's as it 
had been for a study of the earlier period. Brooks's books, now rather dated, 
were not analytical but rather narrative and discursive, and provided more 
lively anecdotal information about literary life in America than have the his-
tories that followed. Douglas provides more synthesis and analysis but re-
captures a narrative strength lost in recent literary studies. If as a whole it is, 
while perhaps even more engaging, less satisfying than her first book, this 
may be due to the strong social and economic evidence shoring up her main 
thesis in The Feminization of American Culture; the psychologlcal argument 
and speculations of Terrible Honesty rest on shakier ground. 
Case Western Reserve University John E. Bassett 
